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Opinions of Counsel: Responsibilities and Liabilities
Gaspare A. Corso, Jr.*
O PINION, as defined in Black's Law Dictionary is "A document pre-
pared by an attorney for his client, embodying his understanding
of the law as applicable to a state of facts submitted to him for that
purpose."
Webster defines Opinion as an expression of professional judgment,
"judgment or belief resting on grounds insufficient to produce certainty."
We live an existence saturated by opinion; indeed little could be accom-
plished without it. Lawyers, however, while they may give opinions
to their families and friends, do not give opinions to their clients.
Again turning to Webster: Opinion, by way of counsel as "worthy or
expedient to be followed" is advice. This semantic distinction, subtle as
it may seem, is critical if we are to develop an awareness of the "pitfalls
of professionalism."
When a lawyer, in his professional capacity, takes pen in hand, he
thereby commits his advice to paper. This is true regardless of whether
the writing be an opinion letter as such, a contract, a will, a deed, mort-
gage or whatever. Implicit in any action he undertakes is the assurance
that he advises as to its propitiousness much in the manner of the late
Letras Communicatorias in Spanish Law which in and of themselves
authenticate and give faith to their contents.'
I have surveyed the views of lawyers and laymen in an effort to
ascertain: what lawyers intend their opinion letters to be, what clients
expect when they request opinion letters, and what is expected by var-
ious governmental agencies from lawyers representing clients before such
agencies. One must keep in mind that individual interpretations vary
greatly and must often be qualified; however, it is possible to draw some
enlightening generalities in the broad area of opinions in general. Of
necessity, though quotes will be isolated as such, sources may not be re-
vealed. Interviews were done on a cross-sectional basis, including indi-
vidual practitioners in practice for one to ten years, ten to twenty years,
and twenty years and over. Larger firms, two or three-man firms, heavy
metropolitan areas, smaller cities and rural areas were sampled. There
were, interestingly enough, few significant differences in the views
among the various groups sampled.
An appropriate starting point is the frank assertion that lawyers, as
a group, do not as a rule expect to be held strictly accountable for their
written advice.
* Member of the Ohio Bar; Executive Vice-President, Ohio Valley Insurance Com-
pany.
1 52 CJ.S. 1053 (1947).
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The average lawyer does not contemplate making decisions for his
client, but rather sees himself as an advisor, pointing out the legal ram-
ifications of a given situation. The younger and the rural individual
practitioner is apt to seek out more information from his client than is
his older, more experienced or metropolitan counterpart. The large firm
will undertake the most extensive survey of a client's situation. Few
lawyers feel obligated to explore with a client the various alternatives
to a contemplated business transaction. The prevailing attitude is one
of "give the client what he wants; he doesn't come to you to be told
what to do, rather how." Most lawyers have in their minds the words
gross negligence, or the phrase standard of competence of lawyers in the
community. Few can readily envision a situation where they might be
held liable for their opinion. It is generally felt that in the area of pro-
fessional judgment, only the most gross abuse could possibly warrant
a claim of liability for negligence: "It's a matter of judgment." The con-
sensus of those sampled seems to be that no attorney can be held
accountable under the law for not being right. "One must surely be
willfully and wantonly negligent precedent to being held liable for his
advice." Almost invariably those queried use adjectives in connection
with culpable negligence such as: deliberate, willful, intentional, or hor-
rendous in nature. "Liability will not attach in a situation where you
have taken an incorrect position, but would most commonly occur where
counsel has failed to do anything at all." Without exception, the first
example given in any interview of this nature is failure to act within
a given statute of limitations.
Formats of opinion letters vary greatly. Generally, the youngest
group and the larger firms will tend to encompass more in the way of
research and precedent. This may be due, in part, to the young lawyer's
enthusiasm to impress the client with his vast knowledge and the large
firms' desire to justify their billing. Few lawyers make a practice of
citing cases or precedent to any extent in their written opinions, except
in cases where individual clients have expressed a desire for this
approach.
"Your client comes to you because he assumes you know the law...
he assumes you are keeping pace with the changes." 2 A client, in most
cases, expects to be fully, accurately and correctly informed.3 Interviews
show that relatively few clients are happy with what they receive from
their lawyers. "What I want and *** what I get are two different things,"
and many corporate executives feel that too often opinions of counsel
leave them where they started.
As pointed out earlier, most lawyers are not strongly inclined to
2 Public Relations Corner, 3 Ohio Bar 74 (1967).
3 Dulberg v. Mock, 1 N.Y. 2d 54, 150 N.Y.S. 2d 180, 133 N.E. 2d 695 (1956).
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urge their clients one way or another. However, it is a very real fact
that this is precisely what the vast majority of clients want: to be told,
in no uncertain terms, what they can and should do. The president of a
large multi-state corporation said that he likes people to take a position,
that he wants them to help him arrive at a decision. It is immedi-
ately apparent that although the lawyer, from his earliest days in law
school, has been thoroughly impressed with the non-existence of the ab-
solutely sure thing in law, and the fact that, in reality, the black letters
are few, the client has not been so informed or convinced. Many clients
feel that somewhere the answer to their problems must be engraved ex-
plicitly on the books. This explains the same clients' impatience with
counsel when they don't seem to come up with the word from Sinai
which the client expects. From the standpoint of the corporate executive,
one of the most discouraging aspects of any situation is to find his counsel
vacillating and indecisive. "I want an answer and I never get it." "I get
a choice of three, four, or five alternatives, with always a hitch to them."
(lawyers) are pretty weak when they give you their opinion,...
you don't know where you are, . . . this is worth nothing to you really."
"They lack crispness and positive approach. .. ."
The corporate or business client wants his attorney to function as an
insider so to speak, to be affirmative in his approach, and positive in his
opinion. Whether or not counsel chooses to exhaust cases or precedent
is of secondary concern to all but the most astute and sophisticated ex-
ecutive. The typical executive is apt to be impressed not so much with
the attorney's briefing ability as he is to be flattered by recognition of
his powers of comprehension. It is also worthy of note that, regardless
of formal education, corporate executives are, as a rule, perceptive and
impatient individuals. They recognize hedging for what it is and are not
apt to appreciate it.
Once having had favorable experience with his counsel's advice and
having been impressed with the competence of such counsel, the average
businessman is apt to rely completely and unhesitatingly upon such
counsel's advice in the future. On the other hand, larger corporations,
especially, secure in the knowledge that they can afford to go "first
class" have very little patience with what they might consider less than
competent legal counsel. William B. Robinson, Chairman of the Board
of Coca-Cola Co., has stated: "In a way, you might liken the general
(corporate) counsel to a doctor in China who is paid just so long as the
patient remains well." I
While clients are apt to blame the lawyer when his advice has
proven less than adequate or has gotten them into trouble, only the rare
4 Robinson, Proceedings of Fordham Law School Institute on Corporate Counsel 9
(1959).
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exception might consider such counsel legally accountable from a negli-
gence standpoint. The majority of executives do feel that the lawyer, if
in fact he has led them down the garden path should, under the circum-
stances, come to the rescue-at a significantly reduced fee.
It is incumbent upon the lawyer dealing with government agencies
in his client's behalf to fully appreciate exactly what his client desires
to accomplish. A thorough understanding of statutory provisions and
the regulations of the agency in question should be a "condition prece-
dent" to any opinion rendered in this area.5 The client's success or fail-
ure in dealing with such agencies will rest almost entirely on the skill
of his legal counsel in drafting the necessary filings.6
Of significance is the fact that while one may not find cases in which
clients have instituted actions against their own counsel, on the basis of
incompetence in handling their affairs, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission has expressed no such reluctance along these lines. Schedule A
of the Securities and Exchange Commission Regulations, now rescinded,
provided that attorneys practicing before the Commission file certificates
stating they were aware of penal provisions of the Federal Code relating
to practice before the Commission. The Securities and Exchange Com-
mission has instituted and continues to institute "interbureau" proceed-
ings against lawyers based upon incompetence and lawyers have been
suspended from practice before the Commission on the basis of such
misfeasance. 7
Counsel having difficulty wading through the "quagmire" of bureau-
cratic regulatory requirements would do well to heed Shakespeare's
admonition:
For many men that stumble at the threshold are well foretold that
danger lurks within. Henry the Sixth, Part III, Act 4, Scene 7.
Philip Habermann, in his article, "Preventive Law" 8 depicts the
plight of a man who was contemplating the purchase of a business and
went to a lawyer to have the contract of sale drafted. The lawyer, with-
out further ado, did exactly what he was asked, made no inquiries ex-
cept for those absolutely essential to his form, gave it to his client, and
collected his fee. As the tale unfolds, the client's deal fell through, he
"lost his shirt."
Mr. Habermann then proceeds with his diagnosis of the transaction,
pointing out what the lawyer should have done. However, nowhere, ex-
cept by implication in the use of the word should, is there any suggestion
5 Redick, Draftsmanship, 64 Business Lawyers Institute 7.01 (1964).
6 Ibid; See also Armstrong, Legal Aspects of Work of the S.E.C., 16 Fed. B. J. 3
(1956).
7 See generally: 17 C.F.R. § 201 S.E.C., Rules of Practice (Revised 1 Jan. 1967).
8 37 Clev. B. Ass'n J. 277 (Oct. 1966).
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that our young businessman might have a legal right to have been in-
formed as to the obvious factors which to him proved disastrous.
This parable raises the issue: Is the association of lawyer and client
to be regarded as no more than a cash and carry relationship?
Professional liability, an area governed mostly by common law, has
changed relatively little over the years.9 The authorities, and on this
point they are numerous, have reached a laudable degree of unanimity
in their conclusion that an attorney shall be held to that standard of skill
and knowledge ordinary and common, reasonable, normal, requisite, fair
and average and within minimum professionally acceptable practices;
further such skill shall be exercised with ordinary and reasonable skill,
care, prudence, diligence and dispatch.'
It would seem, at first blush, that the matter has been fairly well
determined. In reality, the opinions cited provide little in the way of
objective criteria. We are afloat here on a vast sea of norms such as the
ordinary, the reasonable, and the prudent. These are words that defy
definition beyond the specifics of a given moment.
A lawyer is by definition one "skilled in the law," 1 however the
law is seldom exact in a scientific sense.12 We are left then with the
problem of applying the indefinite criteria of the norm to the "imper-
fect" 13 science of the law. Earlier cases chose to avoid the problem by
applying the extreme requirement of gross negligence. Later cases how-
ever tend towards a more sophisticated application of the gross require-
ment. In Glenn v. Haynes14 "gross negligence" was found to be that
which is less than reasonable care.
Ordinarily, reliance upon advice of counsel will be held justifiable
where such advice comes within the scope of the attorney's professional
undertaking as opposed to a mere offhand opinion not involving such
professional knowledge. 15  This justification extends beyond formal
litigation and includes such undertaking as the preparation of legal
documents.16 However, the attorney is not a guarantor of results, nor
9 Curran, Professional Negligence-Some General Comments, in Roady and Ander-
son, Professional Negligence 11 (1960).
10 See generally: Lemley, Due Care in Drafting Real Property Descriptions, 7 Clev.-
Mar. L. Rev. 324 (May 1958); 87 A.L.R. 2d 991, 992 (1963); 96 A.L.R. 2d 827 (1964);
7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client § 143 (1937) at 980; 6 Ohio Jur. 2d, Attorneys at Law
§ 45 at 62, 63 (1954).
11 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client § 3 at 703 (1937).
12 Citizen's Loan Fund & Savings Ass'n of Bloomington v. Friedley, 123 Ind. 143,
23 N.E. 1075 (1890).
13 Humboldt Bldg. Ass'n Co. v. Ducker's Ex'x, 111 Ky. 759, 763, 64 S.W. 671 (1901).
14 Glenn v. Haynes, 192 Va. 574, 66 S.E. 2d 509 (1951).
15 Reeck v. Polk, 269 Mich. 252, 257 N.W. 698 (1934); Reumping v. Wharton, 56 Neb.
536, 76 N.W. 1076 (1898).
16 Annot., 87 A.L.R. 2d 992 (1961).
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the insurer of his client's cause.' 7 He does not agree to possess any man-
ner of infallible judgment, nor will he generally be held liable for this.'
Thus, when we speak of reliance, such reliance is justified only to the
extent of what is ascertained as the accepted standard of performance
in a given case. The client will not ordinarily be justified in expectations
of perfection, nor will counsel as a rule be held to account for a mere
error in judgment, a mistake in an area of law subject to reasonable
question'9 or of doubtful or uncertain interpretation.
20
Suggestions that the applicable standard of care be considered in
light of the specific undertaking are not new, notably in areas where
spur of the moment decisions are called for; here we can contrast the
nature of courtroom decisions against title abstract work. 21 More re-
cently, however, evidence has been found of what may become a new
standard of accuracy in cases of practice before government agencies,
corporate transactions, and financial undertakings.22 Indeed, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission considers an attorney who administers
the legal affairs of a corporation as acting in the capacity of a "quasi-
surety." 23
It becomes increasingly true that in situations involving certificates
or reports by professionals, even where express warranty is lacking, the
holding out of one's professional skill may impose strict liability.24
Although there is no case law pertaining to the possibility or probability
of an attorney's liability for negligence in rendering a written opinion as
such, there is enough law reaching to almost every related aspect of the
profession's service to allow some fairly accurate prognosticating upon
such possibility. There is no discernible reason why attorneys should
17 Kissam v. Bremerman, 44 App. Div. 588, 61 N.Y.S. 75 (1899); See generally:
Gardner, Attorney's Malpractice, 6 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 264 (May 1957).
18 Humboldt Bldg. Ass'n Co. v. Ducker's Ex'x, supra note 13; Spangler v. Sellers, 5
F. 882 (C.C.S.D. Ohio, 1881). See also Great American Indemnity Co. v. Dabney,
128 S.W. 2d 496 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
19 Gardner, op. cit. supra note 17.
20 Citizens Loan Fund & Savings Assn. of Bloomington v. Friedley, supra note 12;
Rapuzzi v. Stetson, 160 App. Div. 150, 145 N.Y.S. 455 (1914).
21 Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P. 2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961). Here the
court, regarding accuracy of information stated "he (counsel) failed, but his failure
fell within the limitations imposed by his undertaking."
22 Green, The Duty to Give Accurate Information, 12 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 464, 485
(1964-65) ". . . the 'duty of care' concept found in the physical injury negligence
cases, with their extravagant defensive layout, intensified procedural ordeal and their
unpredictability of result, seems to serve no useful function."
23 Personal Interview, S.E.C. official.
24 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931); See generally:
Curran, o'p. cit. supra note 9 at 8.
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not be held to the same degree of accuracy as accountants, or bank
personnel.25
Courts have been strict where the handling of security documents
is concerned. It is generaly held that the attorney will be responsible
in the preparation and filing of written instruments, in recording such
instruments, where necessary, or in the duty to inform client of the
necessity for such recordation, for the enforceability of such instruments,
for errors in preparation of accounts or for failure to observe statutory
requirements. 2
6
"An attorney's duty, where he is specially instructed, is to follow
the instructions of his client, . . . the attorney is not free . . . to use
his own discretion to the contrary." 27 Such instructions when expressly
given, must be obeyed to the letter.28  The attorney-client relationship
is essentially one of agency 29 and the attorney's acts and omissions will
be imputed to his client,8 0 although this would not extend to illegal action
without consent of the client.31 This is not to say that such unauthorized
acts may not ultimately be ratified by the client.3
2
Except where statutes of limitations are concerned, whether the
action lies in contract or in tort is not of great significance to this dis-
cussion, nor is it likely to be of great significance in the future. As the
law has developed to date, the action will usually lie in either area.
33
The relationship of attorney-client must exist.3 4 The relationship, how-
25 International Products Co. v. Erie R.R., 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662, 56 A.L.R. 1377
(1927); See Green, op. cit. supra n. 42 at 484: "What the cases under study boil
down to is that when information purports to be factually accurate, there is no room
left for 'exercise of due care' as a defense"; See also Maurer, Ethical and Legal
Problems of the Corporate Counsel, The Business Lawyer 817 (1966). "There appears
to be little if any reason for effecting a distinction between legal and non-legal ad-
vice or service if negligently rendered."
26 McCullough v. Sullivan, 102 N.J.L. 381, 132 A. 102, 43 A.L.R. 928, 25 N.C.C.A. 834:
Held, in effect, that attorney is insurer of the validity of mortgage; See generally:
87 A.L.R. 2d 992, 993 (1963).
27 W. L. Douglas Shoe Co. v. Rallwage, 187 Ark. 1084, 63 S.W. 2d 841 at 843 (1933).
28 Ramage v. Cohn, 124 Pa. Super. 523, 189 A. 496 (1937).
29 Cornell v. Edson, 78 Wash. 662, 139 P. 602, 51 L.R.A. (n.s.) 279 (1914).
30 Mosher v. Mutual Home & Say. Ass'n, 35 Ohio L. Abs. 445, 41 N.E. 2d 871 (1941);
American Export & Inland Coal Corp. v. Matthew Addy Co., 112 Ohio St. 186, 147
N.E. 89 (1925); Bogart v. George K. Porter Co., 193 Cal. 197, 223 P. 959, 38 A.L.R.
823 (1924): it must appear that such knowledge was present in the attorney's mind
when he acted for the client; Fletcher v. Allen, 51 Cal. App. 774, 197 P. 952, 38
A.L.R. 822 (1921).
31 Mefford v. State, 13 Ohio App. 106, 31 Ohio Ct. App. 543 (1920).
32 Sproul v. Lloyd, 96 N.J.L. 314, 115 A. 667 (1921).
33 Lucas v. Hamm, supra note 21 (express contract); Lindner v. Eickel, 34 Misc. 2d
840, 232 N.Y.S. 2d 240 (1962), Aff'd 233 N.Y.S. 2d 238 (implied contract); Floro v.
Lawton, 187 Cal. App. 2d 657, 10 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1960) (negligence); See, for statement
of traditional view, 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client § 155 at 994, 995 (1937).
34 See generally: Blaustein, Liability of Attorney to Client in New York for Negli-
gence, 19 Brooklyn L. Rev. 233, 243 (1953).
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ever, is not dependent upon the payment of a fee and courts will not
ordinarily entertain a plea of no consideration. 35 The crucial element is
the standard of care exercised by counsel even when his services are
gratuitous, or voluntarily undertaken.
3 6
In those actions where a tortious element is lacking, privity has
been a major issue. The traditional doctrine in an action based on con-
tract has been that in the conduct of his professional duties the attorney's
liability extended to his client alone and not to third parties.37 While
this is said to be the majority rule today,38 its applicability, in light of
many modern decisions is very much in question.39
Negligence per se is not applicable in this area and in order to sus-
tain a claim of negligent conduct, there must be a showing of fact.
40
Traditionally it has been incumbent upon the plaintiff to show damages,
the proximate cause, or the "sole" proximate cause, of which, was de-
fendant's negligence.41 However, it is not surprising to find that this
requirement has apparently gone the way of so many obstacles which
would interfere with the redistributive temper of modern courts. It
should be sufficient today to effect a showing of a proximate cause in
meeting the requirement.42
Much of the difficulty in the area of causation centers around what
might properly be designated the but for rule, the necessity of showing
that, lacking the alleged negligence on the part of counsel, the result
would have been otherwise.43 The courts in Feldsman v. McGovern
44
stated, in sustaining defendant's demurrer: "A former client,...
must plead and prove that if the attorney had performed the act it
would have resulted beneficially to the client." In Storer v. Miller,
45
a corporate officer brought suit against his attorney for alleged mis-
35 Bresette v. Knapp, 159 A. 2d 329 (Vt. 1960); Glenn v. Haynes, supra note 14.
36 See Gediman v. Anheuser Busch, 299 F. 2d 537 (2d Cir. 1962).
37 See generally 6 Ohio Jur. 2d Attorney and Client, § 52 (1954).
38 Knepper, Professional Malpractice, Practicing Law Institute Handbook 4 (March
1967).
39 Glanzer v. Sheppard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275, 23 A.L.R. 1425 (1922): Cardozo,
"We state the defendant's obligation therefore, in terms, not of contract merely, but
of duty . . . ; Lucas v. Hamm, supra n. 21; Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.
2d 16 (1958) question of foreseeability, privity not required; See Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, supra n. 24; See, generally: Green, op. cit. supra n. 22 at 483; Also see Wade,
The Attorney's Liability For Negligence, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 755 (1958-1959).
40 Biakanja v. Irving, Id.; Ewing v. McNairy and Claffilin, 20 Ohio St. 315 (1870).
41 Harter v. Morris, 18 Ohio St. 492 (1869).
42 Modica v. Crist, 120 Cal. 2d 144, 276 P. 2d 614 (1954); Ward v. Arnold, 52 Wash.
2d 581, 328 P. 2d 164 (1958) ". . . the law does not require that negligence of the de-
fendant must be the sole cause...."
43 General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp. Ltd. v. Cosgrove, 257 Wis. 25, 42 N.W.
2d 155 (1950); Haggerty v. Watson, 302 N.Y. 707, 98 N.E. 2d 586 (1951).
44 44 Cal. App. 2d 566, 112 P. 2d 645 (1941).
45 2 N.Y. 2d 817, 159 N.Y.S. 2d 834 (1957) (Stockholders' derivative action).
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handling of a stockholder's action against the officer, the court dis-
missed the action by stating, in effect, that the negligence complained of
would not have made any difference. The situation with which we are
concerned has been appropriately described as a "suit within suit." 46
The validity of an action notwithstanding, a plaintiff must generally
allege and prove actual damages in order to effect recovery.47 Any such
recovery will normally be limited to losses actually sustained,48 which
amount may properly take into consideration the fee paid.
49
Statutes of limitation in malpractice claims against attorneys will
vary depending upon whether plaintiff pursues his action in contract or
tort.50 In any event, the bar of the applicable statute will constitute
a valid defense.5 1 Statutory provisions of the various states must be
closely scrutinized to determine their provisions and the application of
such provisions. 52 In Peters v. Powel153 the defendant contended that the
action was barred by Section 50 of the New York Civil Practice Act
which provides a two year statute for "an action to recover damages for
assault, . . . or malpractice." The court stated that though the statute
does apply to doctors and dentists, it does not apply to lawyers. The
rationale of this decision would appear somewhat questionable because
notable also is a recent New York decision stating that even fraudulent
concealment will not toll the statute in a malpractice action for negli-
gence.54 There has been a great deal of disagreement among authorities
concerning when the statute in such cases commences to run. Among
the times adopted are: that which the negligence complained of occurs,55
the time at which the contract of employment is terminated,56 or the time
at which actual damages are incurred. 57 The statute governing the
46 See Coggin, Attorney Negligence ... A Suit Within a Suit, 60 W. Va. L. Rev. 225
(1958).
47 Harter v. Morris, supra n. 41; See, generally: 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client, § 127
at 963, § 154 at 994, § 157 at 997, 998 (1937).
48 Fabry v. Joy, 104 N.J. L. 617, 141 A. 780 (1928); See, generally 87 A.L.R. 2d 995
(1963), regarding mitigation of damages; and note, McGregor v. Wright, 117 Cal. App.
186, 3 P. 2d 624 (1931) (nervous shock and injury to reputation held too remote and
speculative).
49 Pete v. Henderson, 124 Cal. App. 2d 487, 269 P. 2d 78 (1954).
50 Bland v. Smith, 197 Tenn. 683, 277 S.W. 2d 377 (1955) (regarding election of
remedies).
51 Hayes v. Ewing, 70 Cal. 127, 11 P. 602 (1886); Rhines' Adm'rs v. Evans, 66 Pa. 192,
5 Am. R. 364 (1871).
52 Ibid: Sullivan v. Stout, 120 N.J.L. 304, 199 A. 1, 118 A.L.R. 211; Hart v. Guardian
Trust Co., 52 Ohio L. Abs. 225, 75 N.E. 2d 570 (1945).
53 22 Misc. 2d 510, 196 N.Y.S. 2d 304 (1960); Appeal dismissed 214 N.Y.S. 2d 684
(1960).
54 Siegel v. Kranis, 52 Misc. 2d 80, 274 N.Y.S. 2d 968 (1966).
55 Fort Myers Sea Food Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe and Johnson, 253 F. Supp. 626
(D.D.C. 1966); reversed 381 F. 2d 261 (1967).
56 McWilliams v. Hackett, 19 Ohio App. 416 (1923).
57 Fazio v. Hayhurst, 247 Cal. App. 192, 55 Cal. Rptr. 370 (1966), court also stated:
"A cause for damages arising out of an attorney's malpractice survives his death."
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bringing of malpractice actions in Ohio establishes a period of one year
and the cause of action, based upon Galloway v. Hood,58 overruling pre-
vious decisions to the contrary, accrues at the time of the alleged negli-
gent misconduct.
Most of the activity in the field of what is most commonly regarded
as malpractice, in actuality there is no special doctrine of malpractice as
such,59 has been directed toward the medical profession. There exists in
cases involving medical malpractice, much concern with the expert testi-
mony rule, which requires that expert medical testimony must be offered.
The rule would appear to stem from the technical ramifications of the
medical profession as compared with the more discretionary nature of
the law. It might be worth noting that with increasing specialization in
many highly technical fields of law, it is probable that this requirement
will be given more attention in the future.6 0
Res ipsa loquitur is of relatively recent origin in its application to
the field of professional liability,61 although the doctrine has been ex-
panded over the years in cases of known human agency,6 2 it has not
found its way into cases involving legal practice.
One of the more unique aspects of professional negligence cases,
especially where physicians and attorneys are concerned, is what has
been referred to as the conspiracy of silence.6 3 One gets the impression
that laymen, writers, and even the judiciary64 tend to over-dramatize
the fact that there exists on the part of many professionals a hesitancy
to public consciousness of negligence liability. It has been suggested that
such unwillingness to testify has been the major reason for the inroads
made by res ipsa loquitur in the medical malpractice field. Such "con-
spiracy" notwithstanding, it is doubtful whether any degree of rank
injustice has resulted. One must bear in mind that in the area of pro-
fessionalism pecuniary loss is frequently not the greatest concern. The
professional's reputation is his livelihood and any claim of negligence
may result in serious, if not crucial, damage to his stature and integrity.
It has been observed that use of such terms as malpractice or mis-
58 69 Ohio App. 278, 24 Ohio Op. 66, 43 N.E. 2d 631 (1941).
59 Long & Gregg, Property and Liability Insurance Handbook 454 (1965).
60 Donaldsen v. Maffucci, 397 Pa. 548, 156 A. 2d 835 (1959): "Where the common
knowledge or experience of laymen is not sufficient . . . expert testimony in support
of the plaintiff's claim is an indispensable requisite to establish a right of action."
61 Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P. 2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258 (1944).
62 Harland, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Malpractice Cases in Canada, 10 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev.
302 (1961).
63 Curran, op. cit. supra note 9 at 10.
64 Leavell v. Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation, 201 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. La. 1962):
"Thus the plaintiff's case here flounders before it begins on the rock of self-interest";
Brown v. Keaveny, 326 F. 2d 660 (D.D.C. 1963).
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feasance is to be regretted in that they too often carry with them un-
fortunate and unjustified connotations of intent or complete incom-
petency.
0 5
There are approximately 3,300 fire and casualty insurance com-
panies in the United States, which number does not include 1,700 legal
reserve life, 53 reciprocals, the 14 Lloyd's and 2,000 unreported mu-
tuals.6 6 Of these, fewer than twenty-five underwrite lawyers professional
liability, and of those that do, a large percentage undertake such writing
on a limited or restricted basis. This market has shown little growth
since 1964.07 The fact is that most companies, including some of the
largest, will not write professional liability insurance. 68 Specific loss
figures in the area of lawyers liability are difficult to assess as companies
do not generally segregate specific lines of this nature in their profit and
loss statistics. It is, however, general knowledge within the industry that
the experience has not been favorable and heavy losses in professional
liability lines have been offsetting gains in other, more profitable areas.
London is still the major market for this coverage and many domestic
companies are 100% reinsured in London.
In spite of the recent surge in the writing of lawyers liability cover-
age, it is somewhat surprising that the majority of lawyers practicing
individually, or in small firms, are not insured for professional liability.69
Lawyers professional liability is one of the few specialty coverages
which has been standardized in form by the National Bureau of Casualty
Underwriters. It is not unusual, however, for companies to deviate from
this bureau form and in any event, the insured should read his policy
to be assured of his protection. Not only do companies tend to deviate
from the National Bureau but many today are also revising and changing
their policies repeatedly in an attempt to keep pace in a field of relatively
recent development where policy construction has not yet been refined
and clarified through judicial interpretation.7 1
It is important to note that all policies provide separate insuring
clauses for individual and partnership protection. In the case of a part-
nership, both the liability of the partnership and the liability of each
individual member must be provided for.
Under policy provisions captioned "Insuring Agreements," coverage
is provided for liability due to any act or omission of the named insured.
65 Renswick, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Hospital & Malpractice Cases, 9 Clev-Mar. L. Rev.
199 (1960).
66 Orner, Fate of Small and Medium Sized Companies Eyed at Arizona I-Day, The
National Underwriter 33 (March 24, 1967).
67 The Insurance Market Place, 4th Annual Ed. 28, 29, 30 (1966).
68 Editorial, The National Underwriter 47 (Nov. 25, 1966).
69 Curran, op. cit. supra n. 9, at 10.
70 Seybold, Disputes Under Professional Liability Policy, Liability Insurance Litiga-
tion, Practicing Law Institute 12 (Mar. 11-12, 1966).
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The liability referred to is the legal liability, in his professional capacity
as a lawyer. Should a lawyer undertake to guarantee specific results in
a given situation thereby contracting beyond the ordinary standards of
care or should he venture into unrelated fields he will most likely find
himself beyond the scope of his policy coverage. 71
Of particular note is the provision found in most policies to the effect
that settlement may be undertaken only with the written consent of the
named insured. This is a feature unique to professional liability policies
and is in apparent recognition of the value of the professional reputation
as discussed previously.
Of great significance are the unique policy period provisions found
in many policies. These provisions are quite broad and care must be
taken to ascertain what a given policy provides. While such provisions
are generally patterned after the National Bureau, there are many varia-
tions, particularly with respect to the discovery period for claims occur-
ring within the policy term and with respect to provisions for undiscov-
ered claims arising prior to the inception date of the policy. It should be
noted that this provision will generally apply only if such claims are re-
ported prior to expiration of the policy, and also that such coverage is
excess, not pro-rata, over other valid insurance.
There are several basic exclusions involving dishonesty, claims by
salaried employees and bodily injury or property damage. However,
this is another area of wide variation. The National Bureau form lists
five major exclusions and the various policies available are likely to de-
viate markedly, most significantly in areas of fiduciary undertakings and
real estate title and abstract work. It would be wise to scrutinize any
given form to determine its exact exclusions.
Of significance in the handling of professional liability claims for
lawyers is the fact that the insured lawyers may often desire to handle
the claims themselves. Though the idea of the lawyer undertaking to
straighten such matters out for himself seems plausible to some, 72 the
majority of claims executives would take a dim view of such a pro-
cedure. A further observation of some significance in this area of claim
handling would be the relative absence of what are ordinarily considered
nuisance settlements. The lawyer is apt to regard the paying of such
claims as an admission of negligence and thus be much less receptive to
buying his peace than would be many other less sophisticated profes-
sionals.73
71 See Strauss v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 30 Misc. 2d 345, 216 N.Y.S. 2d 861 (1961);
American Fire and Cas. Co., Orlando, Fla. v. Kaplan, 183 A. 2d 914 (D.C.D.C. 1962);
Also see Bancroft v. Indemnity Insurance Company of North America, 203 F. Supp.
49 (W.D. La. 1962) aff'd 309 F. 2d 959 (1962).
72 Dean, Professional Liability Claims, The Independent Adjuster (Fall 1963).
73 Curran, op. cit. supra n. 9 at 10.
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Conclusion
For those who feel that the whole idea of an attorney being held re-
sponsible for less-than-adequate advice or complete failure of advice is
unworthy of serious concern, the time is fast approaching when these
heads had better come out of the sand!
Despite the inexplicable feeling of security on the part of many
otherwise sophisticated members of the legal profession, "rumblings" in
the area of professional negligence, lawyers' negligence in particular,
have been growing louder in recent years. Among members of the pro-
fessions, claims against lawyers are exceeded in frequency and costliness
only by the medical and insurance fields. 74 The growth of claims over
the last decade has been labeled staggering 75 and it continues to increase
rapidly.
Little has been said here which uses the terminology of the main
topic, opinion letters; however, it is impossible to isolate the written
words as such from the sphere in which they are to be utilized. Any
opinion, written or oral, express or implied, general or specific, can only
be judged within the general prevailing legal atmosphere of attorney-
client relationship and the standards of responsibility and accountability
incident thereto.
This examination of today's atmosphere makes it apparent that we
are going through an evolutionary process, not so much in our concep-
tion of the duty of the attorney to his client but in our willingness to
recognize the accountability aspect so long recognized in other areas
where a similar duty is found to lie. Modern courts are more inclined
to add muscle to the recognition that "With representation . . . goes
responsibility." 76
Consider again the plight of the young businessman in light of Judge
Tindal's statement in 1834:
It may be assumed as a general principle that an attorney
undertakes, and is bound to take care, that his client does not enter
into any covenant or stipulation that may expose him to a greater
degree of responsibility than is ordinarily attached to the business
at hand, or at all events, that he does not do so until the conse-
quences have been explained to him.7
7
How much of a risk are you going to let your client run?
How much of a risk can you afford to let your client run?
74 Kabler, The National Underwriter (June 22, 1962). See Hutcheson, Lawyers, How
is your Malpractice? 30 Ins. Counsel J., 423 (1963).
75 Keatley, Professional Men Face More Damage Claims Charging They Erred, The
Wall Street Journal 1 (July 26, 1962).
76 Hon. William K. Thomas, 38 Clev. B. Ass'n J. 45 (Jan. 1967).
77 Stannard v. Ullithome, 10 Bing. 491, 131 Eng. Reprint 985 (1834); Annot., 43 A.L.R.
933 (1926).
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